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Abstract 
Earlier research has implicated metacognitions and attentional control in procrastination 
and self-regulatory failure. This study tested several hypotheses: (1) that metacognitions 
would be positively correlated with decisional procrastination; (2) that attentional control 
would be negatively correlated with decisional procrastination; (3) that metacognitions 
would be negatively correlated with attentional control; and (4) that metacognitions and 
attentional control would predict decisional procrastination when controlling for negative 
affect. One hundred and twenty-nine participants completed the Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scale 21, the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire 30, the Attentional Control Scale, and the 
Decisional Procrastination Scale. Significant relationships were found between all three 
attentional control factors (focusing, shifting, and flexible control of thought) and two 
metacognitions factors (negative beliefs concerning thoughts about uncontrollability and 
danger, and cognitive confidence). Results also revealed that decisional procrastination was 
significantly associated with negative affect, all measured metacognitions factors, and all 
attentional control factors. In the final step of a hierarchical regression analysis only stress, 
cognitive confidence, and attention shifting were independent predictors of decisional 
procrastination. Overall these findings support the hypotheses and are consistent with the 
Self-Regulatory Executive Function model of psychological dysfunction. The implications 
of these findings are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Procrastination can be defined as the postponing of starting, or completing, a task or the making 
of a decision and can be conceptualised as a form of self-regulation failure (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). Procrastination is common: Ellis and Knaus (1977) estimated that up 
to 70% of students procrastinate whilst the overall prevalence in an adult community has been 
found at 20% (Harriott & Ferrari, 1996). Procrastination can have a deleterious impact on 
individuals’ academic and work performance, relationships, and mental well-being (Stöber & 
Joormann, 2001). 
 Research has sought to identify psychological variables that contribute to, or are 
associated with, procrastination. Relationships between maladaptive beliefs concerned with 
perfectionism (Burka & Yuen, 2008), fear of failure (Haghbin, McCaffrey, & Pychyl, 2012; 
Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), self-esteem (Ferrari, 1994), and self-efficacy (Haycock, 
McCarthy, & Skay, 1998) have been found to be associated with procrastination, as well as 
variables related to task characteristics. For example an individual’s susceptibility to boredom is 
significantly associated with procrastination (Vodanovich & Rupp, 1999) as is task aversiveness 
in general (Solomon & Rothblum, 1984). Indeed, using a Principal Components Analysis, Blunt 
and Pychyl (2000) found that boredom and frustration were associated with task aversiveness, 
which in turn was associated with procrastination. Taking a meta-analytical approach, Van Eerde 
(2003) found that the strongest associations with procrastination were with the personality 
factors of conscientiousness, self-efficacy, and self-handicapping (for a review of psychological 
variables associated with procrastination see Steel (2007). 
 Evidence for the efficacy of traditional CBT interventions for procrastination that target 
these maladaptive beliefs and encourage behavioural activation is limited and is often based on 
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single case studies (Rozental & Carlbring, 2013). The exception is a recent RCT that found that 
self-help or guided self-help CBT interventions reduced procrastination compared to a waiting 
list control condition (Rozental, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2014). However, before fully 
evaluating traditional CBT interventions for procrastination, we argue that it would be beneficial 
to address a fundamental limitation of these approaches: i.e., their focus on the content of 
cognitions at the expense of other components of cognition such as attention and cognitive 
regulation (Wells & Matthews, 1996). 
1.1. Failure of self-regulation 
Procrastination has been conceptualised as a failure of performance (Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996; Baumeister et al., 1994; Ferrari, 2001) and emotional (Senecal, Koestner, & Vallerand, 
1995; Sirois & Pychyl, 2013) regulation. Emotional state has been found to be associated with 
procrastination (Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988); furthermore it was found that students are 
more likely to procrastinate with early-term anxiety-provoking tasks (Ferrari & Scher, 2000), 
suggesting that procrastination is an attempt to regulate negative affect. Conceptualising 
procrastination as a failure to self-regulate would be aided by an explanatory framework that can 
help to take our understanding beyond that of the role of maladaptive beliefs. 
 Executive functioning is associated with frontal brain systems and refers to 
neurocognitive processes that govern self-regulation, and its relationship to self-regulation 
failures in procrastination has been investigated. Rabin, Fogel, and Nutter-Upham (2011) found 
that all nine aspects of executive functioning they measured were significant predictors of 
academic procrastination. Intuitively, executive dysfunction seems less amenable to 
psychological intervention. However, as Wells and Matthews (1996) suggest, at least in terms of 
attentional control, there is a difference between the strategic control and consciousness of 
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processing. The Self-Regulatory Executive Functioning (S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 1994) 
model offers a framework in which aspects of executive functioning are hypothesised to be under 
voluntary, conscious control. 
 The S-REF model describes a multilevel cognitive architecture that incorporates a range 
of cognitive processes and attentional strategies and has been used to develop models of 
psychopathology on which successful treatment protocols have been built (Normann, van 
Emmerik, & Morina, 2014; Wells, 2011). According to the S-REF model, psychological 
dysfunction is associated with a style of thinking termed the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome 
(CAS) that consists of heightened self-focused attention, repetitive thinking patterns (rumination 
and worry), avoidance, thought suppression, and threat monitoring. The activation and 
persistence of the CAS in response to stress is influenced primarily by top-down mechanisms, 
which are often triggered in response to low level automatic, or bottom-up, processing or activity 
(Wells, 2002). The S-REF model posits that procedural beliefs, in the form of metacognitions, 
are significant top-down contributors to the activation of maladaptive CAS configurations. 
Metacognitions refer to the information held by an individual about their own cognition 
and internal states, and about coping strategies that impact on both (Wells, 2002; Wells & 
Matthews, 1994, 1996). Examples of information individuals hold about their own cognition 
may include beliefs concerning the significance of particular types of thoughts, e.g., “It is bad to 
think X” or “I need to control thought X.” Examples of information individuals hold about 
coping strategies that impact on cognition may include beliefs such as “Worrying will help me 
get things sorted out in my mind” or “Ruminating will help me solve the problem.” 
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1.2. Metacognitions in procrastination 
Earlier research has implicated a potentially pivotal role for procrastination-related cognitions 
and beliefs in this problematic behaviour (Flett, Stainton, Hewitt, Sherry, & Lay, 2012; 
McCown, Blake, & Keiser, 2012). However, according to the S-REF model, cognitions, core 
beliefs, and conditional assumptions are the output or surface indicators of problematic CAS 
configurations that are governed by metacognitions. Accordingly, sustained modification of 
procrastination-related cognitions will not fully occur without the restructuring of CAS 
configurations.  
Metacognitions have been found to predict psychopathology generally (Wells, 2013). 
Research has also indicated that metacognitions may play a role in procrastination (Fernie & 
Spada, 2008; Fernie, Spada, Nikčević, Georgiou, & Moneta, 2009). In particular, early work by 
Spada, Hiou and Nikčević (2006) found that lack of cognitive confidence is associated with 
behavioural procrastination, leading the authors to postulate that individuals who hold negative 
beliefs about their cognitive efficiency may doubt their task performance capabilities, adversely 
impacting on motivation as well as task initiation and persistence. The authors also observed a 
link between positive beliefs about worry and decisional procrastination explaining this in terms 
of such beliefs facilitating the activation of “internal reality-testing” or “mental problem-solving” 
routines akin to worry (a potentially cognitively demanding activity) which would hinder 
decision-making processes leading to decisional procrastination. 
From the perspective of the S-REF model, procrastination can be conceptualised as a 
metacognitive control strategy (MCS): i.e., a strategy activated with the goal of regulating 
cognitive and emotional states. As with all MCSs, and according to this model, procrastination in 
itself it is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’. MCSs become problematic when they result in perseveration, 
Metacognitions, attentional control and decisional procrastination                                                    June 2015 
 
8 
 
and likewise procrastination becomes maladaptive when it forms part of a ‘paralysed’ CAS 
configuration that fails to lead to either belief change or task completion. Procrastination may 
initiate through ‘choice’; however, its subsequent perseveration may result from: (1) a 
termination of attempts to halt it because of beliefs about its uncontrollability, and (2) the 
activation of other MCSs (such as worry and rumination) that limit available resources for task 
completion.  
1.3. The role of attention in procrastination 
Attentional control refers to the ability to inhibit a dominant attention-attracting stimuli in favour 
of a less salient point of focus that may be more functional (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
Derryberry and Reed (2002) have identified three parameters to describe the voluntary control of 
attention: (1) attention focusing (e.g., ‘‘When I am working hard on something, I still get 
distracted by events around me’’); (2) attention shifting (e.g., ‘‘I can quickly switch from one 
task to another’’); and (3) flexible control of thought (e.g., ‘‘It takes me a while to get really 
involved in a new task’). Evidence has demonstrated that high levels of attentional control enable 
the modulation of reflexive emotional responses, whereas low levels of attentional control 
increase vulnerability to acting on dysfunctional emotional responses (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002). 
  The S-REF model predicts that poor attentional control will result in a reduction in the 
efficiency of belief change and information processing (Wells, 2011). For example, self-focused 
attention plays a role in a wide range of emotional disorders (Ingram, 1990). An internally 
focused, inflexible control of attention limits the processing of externally located stimuli that 
could potentially provide counter-evidence to negative cognitions and beliefs. According to the 
S-REF model, the control of attention is influenced by top-down, metacognitions and lower-
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level, bottom-up activity. Once stimuli intrude into consciousness, procedural beliefs determine 
the strategic response to them: thus, maladaptive metacognitions may result in the selection and 
implementation of poor attentional strategies and, consequently, poor attentional control. In 
terms of procrastination, poor attentional control may: (1) inhibit the modification of 
maladaptive beliefs associated with procrastination; and (2) reduce the availability of resources 
for performance and task completion as a result of self-focused attention draining cognitive 
resources. The management of attention may be vital to self-regulation (Baumeister & 
Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1994). Furthermore, one study found that procrastination 
was partially correlated with attention deficits when controlling for intelligence (Ferrari, 2000). 
In addition research suggests that metacognitions are involved in aspects of attentional control 
(Spada, Georgiou, & Wells, 2010), specifically shifting and focus. 
1.4. Aims of study 
To date, no study has investigated the association between attentional control, metacognition, 
and procrastination. This study aimed to test the following hypotheses: (1) metacognitions 
(positive beliefs about worry) will be positively correlated with decisional procrastination; (2) 
attentional control will be negatively correlated with decisional procrastination; (3) 
metacognitions will be negatively correlated with attentional control; and (4) metacognitions and 
attentional control will predict decisional procrastination when controlling for negative affect. 
Negative affect was included as a control variable as it has been shown to correlate with 
procrastination (Beswick et al., 1988; Steel, 2007) and attentional control (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002). 
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2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
One hundred and twenty-nine participants (99 female) were recruited into this study, with a 
mean age of 40.0 years (SD 11.7; range 16 to 63). The ethnicity of participants was mixed with 
47.3% of the sample self-reporting as white, 36.4% as black, 7.0% as mixed, 3.9% as Asian, and 
the remainder identified another ethnic background or did not specify. Inclusion criteria were: (1) 
18 years of age or above; (2) consenting to the study; and (3) understanding spoken and written 
English.  
2.2. Procedure 
Ethics approval for the study was obtained from an institution of higher education in the UK. A 
web link directing potential participants to the study website was sent on a university email 
circular. The first page of the study website explained the purpose of the study: “To investigate 
the relationship between negative affect, thinking styles, and procrastination”. Participants were 
then directed to a second page containing basic demographic questions and the self-report 
instruments. On completion of the study participants were asked to click on the “Submit” button 
to indicate their consent to participate in the study. Once participants had clicked on “Submit”, 
their data were forwarded to a generic postmaster account. This ensured that participants’ 
responses were anonymous. A second submission from the same IP address was not allowed so 
as to avoid multiple submissions from the same participant. 
2.3. Self-report instruments 
2.3.1. Decisional Procrastination Scale (DPS; Mann, 1982) 
 The DPS consists of five items and examines indecisiveness as it relates to handling 
conflicts in decision-making situations and includes such statements as: “I put off making 
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decisions” and “I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision.” 
Higher scores reflect greater decisional procrastination. The scale has been found to possess 
good psychometric properties with a Cronbach’s alpha of .80 and test-retest reliability of .69 
(Effert & Ferrari, 1989), as well as having strong correlations with behavioural procrastination 
tasks (Beswick et al., 1988), demonstrating face validity. 
2.3.2. Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
The DASS-21 assesses depression, anxiety, and stress. It consists of three factors 
measured by 21 items in total. The three factors measure depression (e.g., “I felt that I had 
nothing to look forward to”), anxiety (e.g., “I felt scared without any good reason”) and stress 
(e.g., “I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing”). Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. The DASS-21 has been reported 
to have good psychometric properties, with internal consistencies for each of the subscales of .91 
(depression), .80 (anxiety), and .84 (stress) in nonclinical populations (Crawford & Henry, 
2003). It has also been shown to possess construct validity in both clinical (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) and non-clinical (Crawford & Henry, 2003) samples.  
2.3.3. Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) 
This MCQ-30 assesses individual differences in metacognitions, judgments and 
monitoring tendencies. It consists of five factors assessed by 30 items in total. The five factors 
measure the following dimensions of metacognition: (1) positive beliefs about worry (e.g., 
“worrying helps me cope”); (2) negative beliefs about thoughts concerning uncontrollability and 
danger (e.g., “when I start worrying I cannot stop”); (3) cognitive confidence (e.g., “my memory 
can mislead me at times”); (4) beliefs about the need to control thoughts (e.g., “not being able to 
control my thoughts is a sign of weakness”); and (5) cognitive self-consciousness (e.g., “I pay 
Metacognitions, attentional control and decisional procrastination                                                    June 2015 
 
12 
 
close attention to the way my mind works”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of maladaptive 
metacognitions. The MCQ-30 possesses good internal consistency and convergent validity, as 
well as acceptable test-retest reliability (Page, Hooke, & Morrison, 2007; Sinclair et al., 2012; 
Spada, Mohiyedinni & Wells, 2008).  
2.3.4. Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002) 
The ACS assesses the ability to voluntarily control attention. It consists of three factors 
assessed by 20 items in total. The three factors measure attention focusing (e.g., ‘‘My 
concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me’’), attention shifting (e.g., 
‘‘After being distracted or interrupted, I can easily shift my attention back to what I was doing’’), 
and flexible control of thought (e.g., ‘‘I can become interested in a new topic very quickly if I 
need to’’). Higher scores predict more resistance to interference in Stroop-like spatial conflict 
tasks, greater disengagement from threat stimuli among highly anxious people (ACS; Derryberry 
& Reed, 2002), and greater activation in brain areas related to executive functioning while 
looking at fear-related pictures (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). The ACS possesses good internal 
reliability and predictive utility (Mathews, Yiend, & Lawrence, 2004). 
3. Results 
3.1. Data configuration 
The distributions of the variables were examined for skewness and kurtosis and subjected to 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality tests to establish the nature of data distribution. These revealed 
that the all of the distributions of the experimental variables were non-normal except for 
decisional procrastination and (lack of) cognitive confidence. However, further examinations of 
skewness and kurtosis suggested a non-normal distribution of all data.  
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 In order to assess the suitability of the data for regression modelling, the following 
factors were considered: there was no evidence of multicollinearity in the dataset: (1) no 
correlations greater than r=.9 were identified between the predictor variables used in the 
regression analyses; (2) the ranges of the Tolerance Index (TI) were between .40 and .82 (i.e., no 
TIs were calculated below .10); and (3) the Variance Inflation Factors (ranging between 1.22 and 
2.80) for all predictor variables were less than 10. Additionally, the Durbin-Watson test 
suggested that the assumption of independent errors is tenable. Furthermore, histograms and 
normality plots suggested that the residuals were normally distributed and plots of the 
regression-standardized residuals against the regression standardized predicted values suggested 
that the assumptions of linearity and homoscedascity were met. 
3.2. Correlation analyses 
The Spearman’s Rho correlation analyses revealed that decisional procrastination was 
significantly and positively correlated with all three factors of the DASS-21 (depression, anxiety, 
and stress) and four factors of the MCQ-30 (negative beliefs about thoughts concerning 
uncontrollability and danger, cognitive confidence, beliefs about the need to control thoughts, 
and cognitive self-consciousness). The analyses also revealed a negative, significant relationship 
between decisional procrastination and all three factors of the ATC (focus, shift, and control). 
3.3. Hierarchical regression analysis with decisional procrastination as outcome variable. 
Variables that were found to be significantly associated with decisional procrastination were 
entered in to a hierarchical regression analysis as predictor variables (see Table 2). On the first 
step, all three DASS-21 factors (depression, anxiety, and stress) were entered because research 
has shown emotion to be associated with procrastination (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Judah, 
Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2014). On the second step, the four factors of the MCQ-30 that had 
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been found to be significantly correlated with decisional procrastination were added to the 
model. Metacognitions were added to the second step because of findings from earlier research 
(Van Eerde, 2003). Finally, all three ACS factors (focus, shift, and control) were added to the 
model. In the final model, stress, (lack of) cognitive confidence, and the ability to shift attention 
after distraction were found to be independent and significant predictors of decisional 
procrastination. The final model accounted for 44.7% of the variance of decisional 
procrastination. 
4. Discussion 
Overall, the results from this study support the hypotheses although they differ in some respects 
to the findings from earlier studies. For example, this study failed to find a significant 
relationship (whether controlled or uncontrolled for negative affect), unlike (Spada, Hiou, & 
Nikcevic, 2006) did, between decisional procrastination and positive beliefs about worry. 
However this study found a significant relationship between decisional procrastination and the 
four other metacognitions, one of which (cognitive confidence) remained significantly associated 
when controlling for both negative affect and attentional control. This study also found that the 
attention shifting parameter of attentional control (i.e., the ability to refocus following a 
distraction) independently predicted decisional procrastination when controlling for negative 
affect and metacognitions. This result aligns itself with earlier research that implicates the 
management of attention in procrastination and failures of self-regulation Spada et al. (2006). 
This finding has implications for individuals susceptible to distraction and the marshalling of 
resources to facilitate performance and affect regulation. 
 Why should cognitive confidence be crucial in understanding decisional procrastination? 
We hypothesize two potential mechanisms. Firstly, negative appraisals of cognitive performance 
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may activate worry (itself a marker of problematic CAS configurations), increasing both 
cognitive load and task aversiveness. Earlier research has suggested worry impairs performance 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1994; Ferrari, 2000). Secondly, lack of 
cognitive confidence may lead to the belief of the need to address perceived deficits with 
additional compensatory strategies, increasing task demands and aversiveness. Indeed, self-
efficacy, which is arguably a related concept to cognitive confidence, has been shown to be 
associated with procrastination (Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillon, 2012). According to the S-
REF model, negative self-efficacy beliefs would be conceptualised as the output of problematic 
CAS configurations. Engagement in worry, rumination, self-focused attention and 
procrastination would impair performance, reinforcing such beliefs. 
We found an association between metacognitions (specifically negative beliefs about 
thoughts concerning uncontrollability and danger and cognitive confidence) and attentional 
control, as well as a relationship between attention shifting and decisional procrastination.  
According to the S-REF model, deficits in attentional control will be: (1) governed in part by 
metacognitions; and (2) reduce the efficiency of belief change and information processing. The 
measurement of attentional control on the ACS relates, fundamentally, to beliefs about executive 
control over attention, rather than an actual index of attention control, and can therefore be 
conceptualised as a form of metacognitive knowledge (see Steel, 2007). In terms of the S-REF 
model, the ACS is a measure of awareness of, over objective, attentional control. 
From a therapeutic perspective the present findings suggest that Metacognitive Therapy 
(Spada et al., 2010) may be helpful in addressing procrastination whilst avoiding the limitations 
of traditional CBT (i.e., the neglect of the role of attention and cognitive processes in regulation). 
MCT interventions aim to modify metacognitions that govern perseverative cognitive processes 
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and maladaptive attentional strategies that impact performance, cognitive, and emotional 
regulation. For example, Attention Training Technique and Detached Mindfulness (MCT; Wells, 
2011) aim to enhance attentional control and cognitive flexibility. Indeed, whilst we were unable 
to identify any studies that assessed MCT interventions in procrastination, a recent meta-analysis 
suggests MCT results in superior outcomes in the treatment of anxiety and depression when 
compared to traditional CBT (Wells, 2011).  
This study has several limitations that will have to be addressed by future research. 
Firstly social desirability, self-report biases, context effects, and poor recall may have 
contributed to errors in self-report measurements. This is to an extent unavoidable as there are no 
objective or interview measures of metacognitions, however in the case of attentional control a 
behavioural test (Normann et al., 2014) exists. Secondly a cross-sectional design was adopted 
and this does not allow causal inferences. Thirdly, the study utilised the MCQ-30 to assess 
metacognitions. Whilst this measure was designed to assess metacognitions involved in worry, it 
may be more appropriate to use the Metacognitive Beliefs about Procrastination Questionnaire 
(e.g. a spatial orienting task; Derryberry & Reed, 2002) that specifically targets procrastination-
related metabeliefs. Fourthly, the majority of the sample was female (77%) and this may limit 
the generalizability of this study’s findings. Finally, in view of the relatively nascent phase in 
which treatment for procrastination finds itself, cautiousness is recommended when interpreting 
the findings and their possible generalizability to treatment. 
Future studies could address these limitations by modifying experimental designs. For 
example, vulnerability to respective recall bias could be addressed by employing ecological 
momentary assessment designs. Research involving experimental manipulation of attentional 
control to test if its enhancement results in lower levels of procrastination (whilst controlling for 
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individual differences in metacognitions) may also prove valuable. It may also be of value to 
explore whether lack of cognitive confidence is related to frustration intolerance (a key concept 
in rational emotive behaviour therapy which shares similarities to metacognitive detachment; Di 
Giuseppe, Doyle, Dryden & Backx, 2014; Ellis & Dryden, 1997) and what is the relative 
contribution of these constructs to procrastination. Finally, examining whether changes in both 
metacognitions and attentional control occur during the process of treatment would be of interest.  
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Table 1: Spearman’s Rho correlation matrix. 
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. DP   .48** .42** .47** .16 .46** .45** .30** .22* -.37** -.44** -.32** 
2. DASS-21-Depression     .54** .60** .16 .49** .29** .35** .24** -.32** -.38** -.40** 
3, DASS-21-Anxiety       .65** .28** .47** .15 .40** .27** -.30** -.16 -.12 
4. DASS-21-Stress         .22* .45** .26** .28** .20* -.40** -.29** -.24** 
5. MCQ-30-1           .29** .12 .33** .34** .02 .04 .08 
6. MCQ-30-2             .38** .43** .43** -.41** -.30** -.25** 
7. MCQ-30-3               .17 .13 -.23** -.34** -.32** 
8. MCQ-30-4                 .53** -.07 -.12 .00 
9. MCQ-30-5                   -.09 -.09 .04 
10. ACS-Focus                     .46** .47** 
11. ACS-Shift                       .45** 
12. ACS-Control                         
Note. DP = Decisional Procrastination scale; DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale 21; MCQ-30 = Metacognitions Questionnaire 30: (-1 = Positive Beliefs about 
Worry; -2 = Negative Beliefs about Thoughts Concerning Uncontrollability and Danger; -3 = Cognitive Confidence; -4 = Beliefs about the Need to Control Thoughts; -5 = 
Cognitive Self-consciousness); ACS = Attentional Control Scale; n=129; * p<0.05; ** p<.01. 
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Table 2: Hierarchical regression model with decisional procrastination as the outcome variable. 
      95% Confidence 
Interval 
Predictor R2 Adjusted R2 B SE β LL UL 
Step 1        
 DASS-21-
Depression 
  .40 .13 .32** .14 .66 
 DASS-21- 
Anxiety 
  -.13 .18 -.08 -.49 .22 
 DASS-21- 
Stress 
  .49 .18 .34** .14 .84 
  .56** .31**      
Step 2        
 DASS-21-
Depression 
  .26 .12 .21* .02 .51 
 DASS-21- 
Anxiety 
  -.21 .17 -.13 -.55 .12 
 DASS-21- 
Stress 
  .40 .16 .28* .08 .72 
 MCQ-30-2   .15 .11 .13 -.07 .37 
 MCQ-30-3   .39 .10 .30** .20 .59 
 MCQ-30-4   .23 .13 .14 -.04 .49 
 MCQ-30-5   -.03 .11 -.02 -.25 .20 
   .67** .45**   .   
Step 3        
 DASS-21- 
Depression 
  .16 .13 .13 -.10 .41 
 DASS-21- 
Anxiety 
  -.13 .17 -.08 -.47 .20 
 DASS-21- 
Stress 
  .36 .16 .25* .04 .68 
 MCQ-30-2   .08 .12 .06 -.15 .31 
 MCQ-30-3   .32 .10 .25** .13 .52 
 MCQ-30-4   .22 .13 .14 -.04 .48 
 MCQ-30-5   .01 .11 .01 -.21 .24 
 ACS-Focus   -.06 .11 -.05 -.28 .15 
 ACS-Shift   -.31 .12 -.21*  -.55 -.06 
 ACS-Control   -.04 .27 -.01 -.57 .50 
  .70* .49*      
 Note. DP = Decisional Procrastination scale; DASS-21 = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale 21; Metacognitions 
Questionnaire 30: (-1 = Positive Beliefs about Worry; -2 = Negative Beliefs about Thoughts Concerning Uncontrollability and 
Danger; -3 = Cognitive Confidence; -4 = Beliefs about the Need to Control Thoughts; -5 = Cognitive Self-consciousness);ACS = 
Attentional Control Scale; n=129; * p<0.05; ** p<.01. 
 
 
 
